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## Russia Oil DA

Russian oil prices at an all-time high

Soldatkin 7/29 – Vladimir, writer for Reuters. (“http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/29/russia-oil-domestic-idUSL6N0FZ22G20130729”, “Russia domestic crude rally surges on, prices at record high”, Reuters, 7/29/13, MCallahan

MOSCOW, July 29 (Reuters) - Domestic crude oil prices in Russia, the world's top producer, surged by over 14 percent to an all-time high last week due to cuts in volumes usually supplied to the spot market by TNK-BP, acquired by Rosneft, and higher international oil prices, traders said. The spot market, with capacity of around 3.5 million tonnes (25.7 million barrels) of crude per month - almost a fifth of all oil consumed in Russia - first felt the shock of the $55 billion TNK-BP buyout in June, when prices surged almost 25 percent. Crude in the domestic spot market is bought mostly by refineries which do not have any, or enough, production of their own. Traders said the quotes for spot delivery in August on the Russian market reached an all-time high after some previous non-binding supply agreements with TNK-BP were scrapped and Rosneft's offers, which traditionally make up a third of the total volume on the market, dried up. The companies are not obliged to supply volumes to the spot market but they sell some barrels domestically, on top of their long-term agreements. The shortages on the domestic spot market and in Europe have started to appear as Rosneft started to boost oil flows to China after securing a $270 billion deal earlier this year to more than double the supplies. Rosneft declined immediate comments on its strategy to supply the domestic oil market. The rise followed an increase in the price of Brent, which last week traded in the range of $106.5-$108.5 per barrel, up from $99.7-103.4 a month earlier. An expected increase in the export duty next month also underpinned the rally. Prices for delivery in August at West Siberian metering points jumped to 14,050 - 14,500 roubles ($430-$440) per tonne from 12,500 - 13,100 roubles in July. This is more than the exporting netback via Baltic Sea port Primorsk - the price excluding transportation costs and export duty - for Urals of 13,150-13,700 roubles, according to Reuters calculations. Higher domestic prices may have contributed to thin Russian export volumes, which in turn supported the prices of Russia's Urals blend on international markets. REFINERIES HIT HARD The rising prices have wiped out refining margins for local plants, which were forced to pay a premium of up to 1,000 roubles per tonne to the exporting netback and scale back production volumes. According to the latest figures from Russia's Energy Ministry, small refineries cut production by 10.5 percent to 958,000 tonnes in June. That bucked last year's trend, when the independent refineries boosted output by 13.5 percent to 12.5 million tonnes (250,000 barrels per day). "Production volumes have been decreasing across the whole country due to uncertainty over resources," a source at a refinery said.

Plan instigates oil trade

Telegraph ’11 - (“US could lift Cuba embargo after oil discovery”, Telegraph, 5/29/2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/cuba/8544870/US-could-lift-Cuba-embargo-after-oil-discovery.html, JKahn)

The five decade-long United States embargo against Cuba could finally be lifted after the discovery of an enormous oil field in Cuban waters. The world's longest-running embargo has endured in part because there was little the US wanted to buy from its impoverished neighbour. But the discovery of between five and 20 billion barrels of oil in the deep waters off Cuba's north coast, only 60 miles away from Florida, has made American businessmen and politicians consider lifting the embargo. Repsol, the Spanish oil firm, will start exploratory drilling within months. If it strikes a large deposit, the trade embargo could be significantly revised or removed, according to Professor Mark Jones, an expert on Latin America at the Rice University of Texas. "The greater the drilling and production, the greater the pressure will be to engage in a complete overhaul of the trade embargo, either getting rid of it altogether or watering it down substantially," he said. "I think it is fairly realistic, since the embargo is an anachronism of the Cold War sustained only by a misguided fear of a backlash from anti-Castro Cuban Americans." Opponents of the US embargo argue that it has failed to drive Fidel and Raul Castro from power and that if Cuba becomes rich from its oil, regime change is even less likely. They also argue that warmer relations between the two countries could help stave off an environmental crisis if there is a spill from the field. Jorge Pinon, visiting research fellow with Florida International University's Cuban Research Insitute, warned: "The US embargo means Repsol can't pick up the phone to Washington. Any equipment to help in a problem would have to come from the UK or Norway or somewhere else." Repsol will drill at least one and possibly as many as five wells in waters of similar depth to those where an explosion on BP's Deepwater Horizon rig caused eleven deaths and led to an environmental catastrophe. In the event of a further disaster, as much as 90 per cent of any spill could end up in US waters. "If there is any leverage that could push the Obama administration or the US Congress to push for change it would be from an environmental standpoint." said John Kavulich, senior policy adviser at the US-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. He argued the US could treat Cuban oil in the same way it treats oil from Venezuela: "We don't like them but we like their product and we are going to buy it". The current embargo expires this September. However, Prof Jones suggested that it is unlikely that Barack Obama will move to lift it w the conclusion of his next run for President.

A surge in world oil production will destroy Russia’s economy

Duffy ‘13, (staff writer), Aimee Apr. 20, 2013. Retrieved Apr. 22, 2013 from http://www.fool.com/investing /general/2013/04/20/cheap-oil-may-be-here-before-you-know-it.aspx

The problem is that isn't quite how it works. Russia, for one, has always been dependent on oil prices. In fact, it was the collapse of oil prices in the late '80s that ended up being the straw that broke the USSR's back. As Tyler Priest wrote in the Journal of American History last June:¶ The oil price collapse also played a lead role in ending the Cold War. It undermined the economy of the Soviet Union, which had quietly become the world's largest oil pro­ducer, dependent on oil export revenues to pay for imported manufactured goods from the West and to support the economies of East European satellites. Plummeting crude prices cost the Soviet Union an alarming $20 billion per year, causing panic in the Polit­buro.¶ Right there you've got the world leader in oil production combined with the necessity of high oil prices, and all that comes of it is a price collapse -- a collapse caused, I might add, by a surge in world production and OPEC's inability to stick to its quota system. The price of oil was halved in one year, falling to $14 in 1986.

Low Russian economy risks nuclear war

Speice, 2006 (staff, William and Mary Law Review), Patrick F. February 1, 2006. Retrieved Apr. 22, 2013 from Lexis.

Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States or its allies by hostile states, as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.

## Gradualism CP

Text: The President of the United States should remove all restrictions on Cuban-American travel and remittances, grant visas to Cubans invited to the United States to participate in educational, cultural, religious, humanitarian, and scientific activities if they pass normal visa security reviews, communicate to the Cuban government its desire to restore the diplomatic function of the Interest Section as its core mission, immediately turn off the electronic ticker-tape billboard on the Interests Section building in Havana, propose immediate resumption of regular consultations with Cuba over implementation of the migration agreements signed by Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and remove travel limits of U.S. and Cuban diplomats.

The counterplan is distinct from economic engagement

Rose and Spiegel 08 (Andrew K. and Mark M., Professor of International Business, Economic Analysis and Policy Group, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley; and Research Fellow, CEPR; and Vice President, Economic Research and Data at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, respectively; “NON-ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE: THE CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES,” 2008, http://www.nber.org/papers/w13988.pdf?new\_window=1)

Countries, like people, interact with each other on a number of different dimensions. ¶ Some interactions are strictly economic; for instance, countries engage in international trade of ¶ goods, services, capital, and labor. But many are not economic, at least not in any narrow sense. ¶ For instance, the United States seeks to promote human rights and democracy, deter nuclear ¶ proliferation, stop the spread of narcotics, and so forth. Accordingly America, like other ¶ countries, participates in a number of international institutions to further its foreign policy ¶ objectives; it has joined security alliances like NATO, and international organizations such as the ¶ International Atomic Energy Agency. In this paper, we concentrate on the interesting and understudied case of international environmental arrangements (IEAs). We ask whether participation ¶ in such non-economic partnerships tends to enhance international economic relations. The ¶ answer, in both theory and practice, is positive. ¶ Memberships in IEAs yield costs and benefits. A country can gain directly from such ¶ interactions; its air might be cleaner, or there might be more fish in the sea. However, some ¶ gains can be indirect. For instance, countries with long horizons and low discount rates might be ¶ more willing both to protect the environment and to maintain a reputation as a good credit risk. ¶ If they can signal their discount rate through IEA activity, participation in IEAs may indirectly ¶ yield gains from improvements in credit terms. Alternatively, countries that are tightly tied into ¶ a web of international relationships may find that withdrawing from one domain (such as ¶ environmental cooperation), may adversely affect activities in an unrelated area (such as ¶ finance). The fear of these spillovers may then encourage good behavior in the first area.

CP solves the aff

LeoGrande 8 (William M. LeoGrande is dean of the School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, DC, and a specialist on U.S. relations with Latin America. “Engaging Cuba: A Roadmap,” World Policy Journal 2008 25: 87, pg Sage //um-ef)

From the time Fidel Castro seized power nearly three generations ago, Cuba has served as an important symbol to Latin America. Washington’s unwavering hostility, which has spanned ten presidents from both political parties, is an anachronistic remnant of the Cold War—a reminder of an era when the United States too often imposed its will on Latin America in the name of its own national security. Nothing would more clearly signal the visionary intent of a young and forward-looking global leader to open a new chapter in U.S.-Latin American relations than a change in Cuba policy. It would be welcomed across the hemisphere, and enable us to work together with our friends on a strategy to create a positive climate for change in Cuba. Internally, Cuba is already in the midst of change, evolving from a centrally planned economy controlled by a single Leninist party to a mixed, market-oriented economy and an increasingly plural civil society. After Fidel Castro fell ill in August 2006 and his brother, Raúl, replaced him as president, the younger Castro opened a candid dialogue with Cubans about the problems they face. In a series of speeches, he acknowledged the inadequacy of state-sector incomes, the inability of state farms to raise agricultural production, the existence of serious corruption and cronyism, and the inequality produced by a dual currency system where people who have access to U.S. dollars and Euros through employment in the tourist sector or from relatives abroad live far better than ordinary Cubans. Raúl has promised action on all these fronts, and has already adopted measures to make daily life easier— such as replacing Havana’s antiquated Soviet buses with a fleet of new Chinese imports. Raúl’s frank discussion of the regime’s shortcomings and declarations of the need for change have raised popular expectations enormously. From the Cuban leadership to the man and woman in the street, Cubans agree that the old system needs a drastic overhaul. The pace and extent of change are uncertain, especially on the political front, but they will depend in part on the external environment—the mix of incentives and disincentives for change that other countries offer. During the presidential campaign, Senator Obama argued that Washington’s policy of hostility, isolation, and economic denial had not achieved the desired result. “We’ve been engaged in a failed policy with Cuba for the last 50 years,” he declared at a campaign rally in Miami. “And we need to change it.” If the United States hopes to exert a positive influence on the changes underway in Cuba, it must reestablish some measure of engagement. More immediately, Cuba and its people are facing an acute crisis that the United States can and should help alleviate, on both humanitarian grounds and out of selfinterest. Hurricanes Gustav, Ike, and Paloma inflicted terrible damage to the Cuban economy, destroying many food crops and stored food supplies. The government itself has warned of food shortages. Over the next year, falling consumption will increase pressures for migration, just as economic privation in 1994, led to the balsero (rafters) migration crisis. President Bill Clinton thought he could put Cuba policy on the backburner after the 1992 election, a shortsighted approach that left his administration unprepared for the migration crisis that followed. President Obama should not repeat that mistake. Acting quickly and decisively now can reduce the likelihood of another crisis next summer, but the cooperation of the Cuban government is essential to complement even the best of American intentions. Engaging People and Government During the presidential campaign, Senator Obama offered two elements of a new Cuba policy—lifting government restrictions on Cuban-American family visits and remittances, and opening a diplomatic dialogue with the Cuban government. These two elements comprise the core of a strategic shift in U.S. policy from one of isolation and deprivation to one of engagement with both the Cuban people and the Cuban government. We can engage the Cuban people by encouraging interaction between U.S. and Cuban societies at all levels—via CubanAmerican family linkages, cultural and educational exchanges, scientific cooperation, and non-governmental humanitarian assistance. President Clinton expanded these people-to-people contacts to good effect. President George W. Bush, however, curtailed almost all interaction with Cuba by U.S. civil society. He ended most categories of travel for cultural and educational purposes. He restricted religious, scientific, and Cuban-American travel. He virtually banned travel to the United States by Cuban scholars, artists, and scientists. During the Bush years, authentic civil society contact between the United States and Cuba was replaced by narrowly targeted U.S. government material support for selected Cuban dissidents. Washington publicly proclaimed that this support was intended to subvert the government, leading Cuban authorities to do everything possible to make America’s efforts ineffective, including the imprisonment of many aid recipients. Engaging the Cuban government diplomatically will reduce bilateral tensions, help avoid future crises, and advance U.S. interests on a variety of issues. Every American president from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Bill Clinton held negotiations with Cuba, and Ronald Reagan signed more agreements with Havana than any other president. Only George W. Bush refused to see the utility of skillful diplomacy. Just as he cut off people to-people exchanges, he cut off virtually all diplomatic contact between the United States and Cuba, using the U.S. diplomatic mission in Havana as a depot for aiding Cuban dissidents while publicly excoriating the Cuban government. President Obama has declared that the goal of U.S. policy should be to seek democ racy in Cuba, but diplomacy offers only an indirect path to a democratic opening. Cuban leaders will not negotiate their domestic political arrangements with a foreign country, any more than we would. When Raúl Castro offered in 2006 to negotiate with the United States on a basis of equality and mutual respect for sovereignty, he was signaling his rejection of U.S. demands that Cuba change its political regime. That has been Cuba’s unwavering position since 1959, and if we insist on explicitly adding democracy to the agenda, negotiations will go nowhere. Our allies in Latin America and the European Union who have been pursuing strategies of engagement with Cuba for many years can attest that this is the one issue that is always off the table. Nevertheless, through engagement they have been able to reach bilateral agreements with Cuba on issues of mutual interest and, in some cases, win freedom for some political prisoners. A strategy of engagement should be designed to create an international environment that makes it beneficial for Cuban leaders to allow greater political and economic liberty on the island, while at the same time creating a more vibrant civil society that will, in time, press Cuba’s leaders from below to allow a political opening. This indirect approach will not work quickly and it offers no guarantees, although similar strategies proved successful in promoting democratic transitions in Spain and Greece in the 1970s, in Chile, Brazil, and Mexico during their transition from authoritarian rule, and in Eastern Europe at the end of the communist era.

The plan destabilizes Cuba – only the CP solves

Azel 08 (September, “How to Think About Change in Cuba: A Guide for Policymakers,” José Azel is currently a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and CubanAmerican Studies, University of Miami, http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/Research\_Studies/Article-Azel-FINAL.pdf)

But suppose that the U. S. government and the other constituencies - Cubans in the island and in exile, and the international community - are persuaded that economic changes per se represent an opening that should be rewarded in some fashion. A case in point is the argument that, in the case of Cuba, a very gradual approach to changes is called for in order to avoid the possible chaos resulting from more comprehensive and rapid changes. Cuba’s abysmal set of initial sociopolitical and economic conditions is such that the introduction of comprehensive massive changes could result in a failed state. Some may be tempted to dismiss this concern by noting that by some parameters (e.g. the pervasive informal economy, reluctance to participate in formal employment, etc.) Cuba is already a failed state. But technically Cuba is not a failed state.10 It is a stable closed state still able to implement and enforce government policy, albeit not uniformly particularly in economic matters. Therefore the gradualist argument deserves more serious considerations as it is always possible for conditions to get worse. The main concern hinges on the precarious balance between openness in a society and stability in that society. It is certainly the case that economic reforms – particularly reforms to begin a transition from a command economy to a market economy – are destabilizing. Decollectivization and desocialization create enormous social dislocations. They require a repositioning of the role of the state and a new model of socialrelationships between the state and its people. Whatever the specific strategies selected they will demand many difficult choices. As Ian Bremmer points out in “The J Curve,” “for a country that is “stable because it’s closed” to become a country that is “stable because it is open” it must go through a transitional period of dangerous instability.” These are thoughtful security considerations that must be weighted by policymakers. Unfortunately Cuba’s present politico-economic system can not be the starting point for a serious development and reconstruction process. The country’s existing bureaucratic, institutional, and organizational framework is not conducive to the creation of a new state.

## Brazil DA

Brazils sugar industry is growing but is fragile

Ewing 13 (Reese, 2/11/13, “Analysis: Big crop, policy revive Brazil’s sugar-ethanol mills,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/11/us-brazil-ethanol-investments-idUSBRE91A14A20130211)//DR. H

Brazil's big sugarcane mills have begun to invest in ethanol production again, after licking their wounds from years of slim margins, as an expanding crop and favorable government policies brighten the horizon for the biofuel.

The world's largest sugarcane industry is still fragile, but a record cane crop is swelling in the fields nearly ready for harvest, which will improve mills' profit margins by spreading costs over a bigger stream of revenue.

"Just a little more cane, and the industry's cup will be entirely full," Carlos Eduardo Cavalcante, director of the bioenergy department at the BNDES development bank that funds much of the sector, told Reuters. Cane will surpass crushing capacity by 2015, he said.

Brazil will without a doubt produce more sugar and ethanol with its next crop, analysts say, but weak prices and limited capacity for producing the sugar will force mills to devote a greater share of the crop to ethanol.

That could provide some relief to Petrobras (PETR4.SA), Brazil's state controlled oil company, which has faced heavy losses on spiraling demand for imported gasoline as consumers avoid high cost ethanol.

Brazil's ethanol sector started aggressive expansion almost a decade ago amid euphoric prospects for the biofuel with the launch of the flex-fuel car that could burn ethanol, gasoline or any mix of both.

But the heavy debts mills took on in the race to grab a share of this growing market left them financially vulnerable and the advent of the 2008-09 credit crunch left many mill owners insolvent, forcing them to sell out to larger, more cash-flush multinational commodities and oil companies.

Mills cut investment in renewing cane plants as they tried to get back on their feet financially, hitting output as yields from ageing cane dipped. But a wave of replanting backed by government-subsidized credit is boosting output. And aggressive replanting campaigns are now putting the sector back on its growth trajectory.

In addition, the government's decision to raise fuel prices last month and increase the mandatory blend of ethanol in gasoline will help increase demand for the biofuel at home.

Ethanol and gasoline compete for the same market of light vehicles using the flex engine whose owners opt for one fuel or the other depending on the price differential. Ethanol once held half of this market but poor cane crops and higher ethanol prices reduced that share to about 30 percent at present.

Currently, ethanol is a more economical buy for motorists in only Sao Paulo, Parana, Mato Grosso and Goias of Brazil's 26 states.

The growing U.S. market for advanced biofuels should also soak up some of the expected rise in output in Brazil, the second largest ethanol producer after the United States.

the plan wrecks the Brazilian sugar industry and causes US sugar protectionism

Miami Herald 02 (6/26/02, “Cuba embargo under fire - Sally Grooms Cowal's Group cites benefits for U.S.,” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/706185/posts)//DR. H

4. The next reason in favor of doing away with the embargo runs as follows: Look here, there is money to be made in Cuba. Remember Coolidge’s, the "business of America is business?" If everything else fails, appeal to greed . There are some salivating mouths claiming that 6 billion dollars worth of goods and commodities could be sold to Cuba. But unless the U.S. takes the place of the Soviet Union and initially subsidizes the Cuban economy with credits and loans (coming out of American tax paying pockets), and rebuild its shattered infrastructure at a cost of billions upon billions of dollars, the U.S. would have to buy Cuban sugar produced by workers paid now 10 dollars per month in order to enable Cubans to have money to pay for all these goodies, without any guarantees that the large portion of the profits made would not go first to the apparatus of repression (armed forces, secret police and Communist Party cadres) and to the modernization of its weapons systems and only lastly, to the Cuban people. Moreover, one must ask: what happens to the sugar industry of Florida now producing 25% of the sugar consumed in the U.S.?. Furthermore, according to the American Sugar Alliance, 80-85% of the sugar produced in the U.S. is consumed here. The remainder 15% is imported from 40 foreign countries--about 1,5 million tons. Under WTO and NAFTA rules the U.S. is required to bring in AT LEAST that amount, even if the U.S. does not need it now! Any sale of Cuban sugar to a sugar producing country like the U.S. would mean that there would be less of the market for the American sugar industry to go around.

In addition, what would happen abroad to Brazil’s sugar market, one of the largest producers of sugar, (even if a significant amount of that country's sugar is used to produce ethanol)? and to the Dominican Republic’s or Mexico's market? to mention only three sugar producing countries in our hemisphere. We should ponder, in this context, the following statement issued on August 10, 2000 by Joseph Terrell, Director of Public Affairs of the American Sugar Alliance: "We are well aware of the challenges lifting the Cuban embargo could have on the US sugar industry. Also, quota holders in other countries are monitoring the situation closely as well because they could stand to lose…we are monitoring this closely." A similar view has been advanced by the general manager of the Louisiana Sugar Cane Cooperative and secretary/treasurer of the Louisiana Farm Bureau Foundation, Jackie Theriot, who said: Lifting the embargo -- without holding Cuba to production limits -- would flood the U.S. market with sugar, dropping the prices and bankrupting the domestic industry. (quoted by Kevin Blanchard in his article "Now no Time to Help Cuba," The Advocate ONLINE (April 11, 2002) However, it is unlikely that Castro's Cuba would accept being hamstrung by production limits and it would go against the free trade ideology espoused by Washington these days.

Is the U.S. going to harden the grip of Castro by granting him even a significantly diminished market opening at the expense of its own sugar industry? Imperil the Brazilian sale of sugar to the U.S. just to please Castro? Is the U.S. going to finance the the conversion of Cuban sugar into ethanol, as means to reduce the worldwide glut of sugar even though the prospects of creating a large U.S. ethanol market is still an economic entelechy? Moreover, consider that during one year, in the decade of the 50’s (1959, for example) Cuba’s sugar quota in the U.S. totaled 1.256 million metric tons, roughly the same amount that the U.S. now imports from 40 countries! It is well known that when Cuba lost its generous American sugar quota in the 60’s this amount was allocated to other countries. which used the allocation to maintain their sugar industry and increase their production. What would be the ripple effect of the Cuban re-intervention in the American sugar market, given that it will be considerably less than what it sold in the 50’s and will offer sugar at a low price to gain a foothold in the market? This macroeconomic assessment has not been addressed in the public arena by Castro’s acolytes and foot soldiers in this country. In addition, in the case Dominican Republic, the European Union subsidized exports have already caused a 20% income loss of income in that country. If Cuba’s sales of sugar take a slice of the American market, both the domestic and international suppliers, such as the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Mexico (who incidentally, has been encouraged to develop an ethanol industry) are going to feel even more severely impacted. Even if Cuba did not make efforts to create a capital intensive industry, as the cane sugar producers in the U.S and producers of sugar in the world have done it, Cuban sugar would be produced more cheaply, as already indicated, doubtlessly, with Communist government subsidies in order to retain a share of the American market.

Sugar industry’s key to Brazil’s economy

SC 12 (Sugarcane.org, AT: Website’s Bias!!! – Cites objective data…, 6/19/12, “Impact on Brazil's Economy,” http://sugarcane.org/the-brazilian-experience/impact-on-brazils-economy)//DR. H

The sugarcane industry – including cultivation, processing and refined products – represents an important segment of the Brazilian economy.

Economic Contribution

In 2010, the sugarcane sector contributes US$50 billion to Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) – equivalent to almost 2.4% of the entire Brazilian economy and comparable to the GDP of a European country like Slovenia (US$47.7 billion).

When you add in the various suppliers and stakeholders who depend on Brazil’s sugarcane industry, the entire sugarcane agro-industrial system generates gross revenues totaling more than US$86 billion annually.

Good Jobs

The sugarcane industry employs 1.28 million workers, according to 2008 data from the Ministry of Labor and Employment’s Annual Report of Social Information (RAIS).

Brazil economic instability causes nuclear war

Shulz 2k (Donald, Research Professor of National Security Policy at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: SHAPING AN ELUSIVE FUTURE, March)

While we are in a speculative mode, it may be useful to raise the issue of whether, two or three decades from now, the United States might have to deal with a regional hegemon or peer competitor. The most obvious candidate for such a role would be Brazil, which already accounts for almost half of Latin America’s economic production and has by far the largest armed forces in the region (313,250 active troops).53 That country could very well assume a more commanding political and military role in the decades ahead. Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil has been that it might acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian military embarked on a secret program to develop an atom bomb. By the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively pursuing nuclear development programs that had clear military spin-offs.54 There were powerful military and civilian advocates of developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, however, the situation has changed. As a result of political leadership transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now appear firmly committed to restricting their nuclear programs to peaceful purposes. They have entered into various nuclear-related agreements with each other—most notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all their nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Agency—and have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even so, no one can be certain about the future. As Scott Tollefson has observed: . . . the military application of Brazil’s nuclear and space programs depends less on technological considerations than on political will. While technological constraints present a formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The critical element, therefore, in determining the applications of Brazil’s nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.55 Put simply, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to democracy than the military. The example of Peru’s Fujimori comes immediately to mind. How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina in the first place.) 56 In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems. That government would probably need foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify its existence. One obvious candidate would be the United States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a predatory international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political support to the regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of “foreign intervention.” Indeed, as far back as 1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the region into a “new Vietnam” if developed countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers. 57 Since then, of course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./ international concerns over the Amazon—the threat to the region’s ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian question, etc.—have not disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, if the growing trend towards subregional economic groupings—in particular, MERCOSUR—continues, it is likely to increase competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA countries. Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify political differences, and could lead to heightened politico-military rivalry between different blocs or coalitions in the hemisphere. Even so, there continue to be traditional rivalries and conflicts within MERCOSUR, especially between Brazil and its neighbors, and these will certainly complicate the group’s evolution. Among other things, the past year witnessed a serious deterioration of relations between Brazil and Argentina, the product partly of the former’s January 1999 currency devaluation, which severely strained economic ties between the two countries. In part, too, these conflicts were aggravated by Argentina’s (unsuccessful) bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Brazilians interpreted as an attempt to gain strategic advantage. The upshot was that relations soured to the extent where questions have been raised as to the continued viability of MERCOSUR itself. In light of these problems, one cannot but wonder what impact a resurgence of Brazilian authoritarianism, combined with a push for regional hegemonic status, would have on Argentina, currently a “non-NATO ally” of the United States.

## Syria Politics DA

The Syria authorization will pass but it will be a tough fight - capital is key to GOP support

Cohen, 9/3/13 (Tom, “Syria war resolution faces tough challenge in Congress” CNN,

<http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/politics/obama-syria-congress/>)

To Darrell West, the vice president and director of governance studies at the Brookings Institution, support from the House is the biggest challenge for Obama. "There are very few moderates that are left and it's a highly polarized institution," he noted, adding that what amounts to a war authorization vote was likely to shake up the normal partisan line in Congress. "You could have libertarian Republicans joining liberal Democrats to vote no, just because they're tired of foreign adventures," West said. "It may come down to Republicans who support a strong foreign policy joining forces with Democratic moderates to give approval." A new ABC News/Washington Post poll released Tuesday showed that nearly six in 10 Americans oppose military strikes against Syria, with similar results from respondents identifying themselves as Democrats and Republicans. The administration has launched what it calls a "flood the zone" lobbying effort to persuade legislators to support the resolution authorizing military strikes against Syria. This effort in Washington includes classified briefings, testimony of Cabinet members at committee hearings, and meetings with the president. Mindful of concerns that a strike on Syria will lead to a prolonged engagement, Obama said Tuesday that "this is not Iraq, and this is not Afghanistan." "This is a limited, proportional step that will send a clear message -- not only to the Assad regime, but also to other countries that may be interested in testing some of these international norms -- that there are consequences," the president said. At the hearing by the Senate panel he used to chair, Secretary of State John Kerry later said that "neither our country nor our conscience can afford the cost of silence." However, Obama departs on Tuesday night on a four-day trip to Sweden and Russia at a time when members of both parties clamor for him to be directly involved. With congressional elections next year, many legislators feel that the safe vote on Syria right now is to oppose the Obama resolution, CNN Chief National Correspondent John King said Tuesday. "The president has to sway and the most important people he'll meet with today are the House Republicans," King said. "He doesn't have good relationships with them, very few personal relationships with them. They don't trust him. They don't support most of his other policy initiatives." Speaking before Boehner and Cantor publicly backed Obama, King said the president needed the House GOP leadership to "lobby their own members, saying this is the right thing to do even if you don't agree with the president." Cantor's statement did just that, even taking on a popular GOP talking point that Obama had erred by previously declaring chemical weapons use a "red line" that would bring a U.S. response if Syrian President Bashar al-Assad crossed it. "The United States' broader policy goal, as articulated by the president, is that Assad should go, and President Obama's red line is consistent with that goal and with the goal of deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction," Cantor said in the statement. "It is the type of red line virtually any American president would draw." However, Boehner's spokesman, Michael Steel, made clear that the speaker was leaving it to Obama to persuade legislators to support him. "It is the president's responsibility to make his case to the American people and their elected representatives," Steel said in a statement, adding that "all votes authorizing the use of military force are conscience votes for members, and passage will require direct, continuous engagement from the White House." Obama met Monday with two veteran Republican senators -- John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina -- who emerged to say they could support a more precise and robust strategy than the president initially outlined. In particular, McCain and Graham said Obama pledged increased military aid to opposition forces in Syria that would bolster their fight against al-Assad at the same time as U.S. military attacks expected to to involve cruise missile strikes on Syrian military command targets. After Obama met Tuesday with Boehner, Pelosi and the chairs of several national security committees in Congress, legislators from both parties said they expected the initial resolution proposed by the president to be revised to address their concerns. In particular, they said it would define the mission more narrowly and specify no "boots on the ground," which means no U.S. troops would be deployed to Syria. West noted that no matter what lobbying takes place, "there are some Republicans who will vote 'no' just because the idea came from President Obama" because "they detest everything he stands for." Moderates, meanwhile, may face the prospect of a primary challenge from the more extremist wing of their respective party if they authorize a war resolution, he said. "Anti-war sentiment remains very strong within the Democratic Party," West said, noting that grass-roots activists on the left opposed the Iraq war at the height of post 9/11 patriotic fervor. "The idea of another foreign intervention would be of great concern to those people." In the end, West said he expects Obama's resolution to win approval because "the president has laid national prestige on the line." However, a House GOP leadership aide told CNN that "it is going to be a big lift to get this done." "We're only going to be able to help the president as much as he's willing to help himself," the aide said on condition of not being identified, noting Obama must be personally involved, make the case for military action and "prove that we have a military plan that will work and not drag us into the mud for a long time."

Plan destroys Obama’s PC

LeoGrande, 12

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The 113th Congress Congress has held a central role in U.S. policy toward Cuba ever since it codified the U.S. embargo into law in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton). To move beyond limited improvements in relations on issues of mutual interest or limited commercial activity– that is, to move toward the full normalization of diplomatic and economic relations– the president would have to win congressional approval to change the law. In 2000, the Congress passed the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, which legalized the sale of food products to Cuba, albeit on a cash-only basis, but at the same time prohibited tourist travel by U.S. residents. For the next four years, the bipartisan Cuba Working Group in the House of Representatives worked to end all prohibitions on travel to Cuba. In 2001, Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.), the founder along with Bill Delahunt (D-Mass.) of the Cuba Working Group, introduced an amendment to the Treasury appropriation bill prohibiting enforcement of the travel ban. The House approved it in July by a wide margin (240-186), but it was dropped in conference committee by the Republican House leadership in response to Bush’s veto threat. For the next three years, this scenario was replayed annually. The House (and the 27 Senate in 2003 and 2004) voted to end enforcement of the travel ban, but congressional Republicans conspired with the White House to prevent it from becoming law by repeatedly dropping the provision from the final bill. “People are wrong to underestimate what it means to have President Bush on our side,” Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-Fla) said with satisfaction. By 2005, 28 a sense of futility had eroded the Cuba Working Group. Aided by campaign contributions to key members of the House from the new pro-embargo U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, Republicans were able to defeat amendments easing restrictions on travel to Cuba and block consideration of others in 2005 and 2006.29 With President Obama promising a new policy of engagement toward Cuba and having lifted travel restrictions on Cuban Americans in 2009, freedom-to-travel advocates launched a new congressional campaign to lift the travel ban. With large Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, hopes ran high for success. Over 170 cosponsors quickly signed on in the House. A broad coalition of some 130 business groups and foreign policy NGOs formed behind the campaign, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, American Farm Bureau Federation, National Farmers Union, American Society of Travel Agents, Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. The travel web site Orbitz collected over 100,000 signatures on a petition to lift the travel ban. As a measure of its commitment, the Chamber of Commerce warned legislators that their vote on Cuba would be “scored” as a key business vote included in the Chamber’s annual “How They Voted” scorecard.30 Public opinion, even among Cuban-Americans, favored the freedom to travel. A 2008 poll in south Florida by Florida International University found that 67% favored “ending current travel restrictions for all Americans.” A national poll of Cuban-Americans the following year by Bendixen and Associates found the same result, and a 2010 poll by a faculty member at the University of Miami found support at 64%. The general public’s view was even more lopsided: 31 70% favored unrestricted travel to Cuba, and even 62% of Republicans agreed.32 Opponents blasted the freedom-to-travel coalition as venial for putting dollars ahead of human rights. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who pledged to filibuster the bill if it ever got to the Senate, denounced businessmen who “only care about padding their profits by opening up a new market,” even though it meant “enriching the Castro regime.” Congresswoman Ros 33 Lehtinen attacked proponents of free travel for, “seek[ing] to reward the Cuban regime with tourism cash flows as the dictatorship tightens its stranglehold on the Cuban people.”34 The legislative vehicle for opening travel and facilitating agricultural sales was House Resolution (H.R.) 4645, the “Travel Restriction Reform and Export Enhancement Act,” cosponsored by House Agricultural Committee Chair Collin Peterson (D-Minn) and Jerry Moran (R-Kan.). It cleared the Agricultural Committee on July 1, 2010, by a narrow 25-20 margin, and was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee. For weeks, Committee Chair Howard Berman (D-Calif.) tried to collect the votes needed to report the bill out to the House floor. In September, still one or two votes short, with Congress drawing to a close for the election campaign, he gave up. The bill died in committee. The principal obstacle faced by supporters of the travel bill was not the opposition of Republicans like Ros-Lehtinen and the Diaz-Balart brothers, but opposition from moderate and conservative Democrats.

 In the Senate, not only did Menendez promise to block any travel bill, Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev) also opposed unfettered travel, and he controlled the flow of legislation to the Senate floor. In the House, Debbie Wasserman Schultz, a rising star of the party from south Florida, took it upon herself to organize opposition to the travel bill within the Democratic caucus. Wasserman Schultz was in charge of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee's “Red to Blue” project in the 2008 election cycle, aimed at unseating Republican incumbents (though not in south Florida, where Wasserman Schultz refused to campaign against her three Republican friends– Ros-Lehtinen and the Diaz-Balarts). Many freshman Democrats– especially those from relatively conservative districts– were in her debt. A vote on Cuba, which was not a salient or popular issue in their constituencies, was a small price to pay to stay in Wasserman Schultz’s good graces. When supporters of the travel bill first rolled it out with 178 cosponsors, Wasserman Schultz recruited 53 House Democrats to write a letter to Speaker Nancy Pelosi declaring their determination to vote against it– a formidable number that foreshadowed a nasty battle inside the Democratic caucus if the bill went to the House floor, and put final passage in doubt. In 2011, President Obama selected Wasserman Schultz to chair the Democratic National Committee

A failed Syria vote spurs global appeasement, allied prolif, nuclear use and shreds U.S. primacy

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On Saturday, when President Obama overruled his advisers, reversed his own policy and declared that he would not act against Syria until Congress has had its say, he did not—as he might have—recall Congress for that purpose. Instead, Mr. Obama said he would let the vote wait for 10 days or more. Then he promptly left the White House for the golf course. Later this week, he'll travel to Stockholm and then to St. Petersburg, Russia, for a G-20 economic summit. Mr. Obama's dwindling band of defenders insist that this decision "to seek authorization for the use of force from the American people's representatives in Congress" was a matter of principle which had escaped him in Libya in 2011, and that only occurred to him now after many days of plotting an air campaign against the Syrian government for its use of chemical weapons. Others, less charitably inclined, see in his Saturday announcement a mixture of unworthy motives—an outright panic when British Prime Minister David Cameron lost a war vote in the House of Commons; an unbecoming wish that Congress would give him an excuse for inaction; and an unworthy scheme to stick his enemies (as he understands them) in Congress with a responsibility he hopes to shirk. It is beside the point to assess these motives. Congress now has decisions to make. This is the argument that lies before them. The case against authorizing the use of force begins with an indictment of the administration's feckless policy toward Syria. Mr. Obama chose passivity two years ago when he might have tipped the balance to a then largely secular opposition. He concocted and then ignored red lines regarding the use of chemical weapons. And he has, with this latest backflip, shown himself eager to squirm out of his own commitments, even as the rhetoric of his pronouncements ("limited," "tailored," "no boots on the ground," etc.) indicates far more interest in what the U.S. will not do than what it should do, and why. The president's critics will further note, and correctly, that war is war, and, as such, unpredictable. As Winston Churchill put it: "Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter." Despite Mr. Obama's statements about narrowly defined goals, precise uses of force and limited duration, it is entirely reasonable to expect that such a strange voyage may lie ahead once operations begin, and that he is singularly ill-fitted to navigate it. Finally, as a practical matter, critics can ask why the U.S. should intervene after a massacre, however hideous, of some 1,400 Syrians, when America has refused to act over the slaughter of 100,000 in the preceding two years. And, even if the U.S. strikes at Assad and helps bring about his downfall, the danger is real that having administered a defeat to the regime and its sponsor, Iran, America will hand a victory to al Qaeda. These are all serious arguments. But weightier are the counterarguments. For better or for worse, the credibility not only of this president, but of America as a global power and a guarantor of international order, is on the line. If the U.S.—after its president said two years ago that Assad must go and then, a year later, drew a red line at Syria's use of chemical weapons—now does nothing, profound conclusions will be drawn by a China ready to bully its neighbors, by a North Korea whose scruples are already minimal, and by an Iran that has already killed many Americans in a covert war waged against us in Iraq and Afghanistan. America's friends will realize that its word means nothing. As a result, they will either abandon us, or arm themselves with nuclear weapons. And these countries will be increasingly willing to wield them in a world in which they have no great ally who may be counted upon to stand by them in an hour of need. One has to suspect that the Syrian government deliberately used sarin in the Damascus suburbs while United Nations inspectors were in the capital, and on the eve of the anniversary of Mr. Obama's red line statement. The essence of tyranny is this message to a population: "We will impose our will on you. No one cares about your suffering, and no one will do anything to rescue you." Assad's message was delivered by chemical weapons of mass destruction. Civilized nations let that message remain unanswered at their peril. The U.S. now faces a twofold problem. The first is that many Americans who came of age in the past 25 years, having grown up in a world that has been shaped by U.S. primacy, take that primacy and the stability and prosperity it has brought for granted. They should not. It hangs in the balance.

Extinction

Barnett 11 (Thomas, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” The World Politics Review, March 7, 2011, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>)

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, and a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding. As a result, the vector of structure-building connectivity shifted from trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific. But if the connectivity push of the past several decades has been from West to East, with little connectivity extended to the South outside of the narrow trade of energy and raw materials, the current connectivity dynamic is dramatically different. Now, the dominant trends are: first, the East cross-connecting back to the West via financial and investment flows as well as Asian companies "going global"; and second, the East creating vast new connectivity networks with the South through South-South trade and investment. The challenge here is how to adjust great-power politics to these profound forces of structural change. Because of the West's connectivity to the East, we are by extension becoming more deeply connected to the unstable South, with China as the primary conduit. Meanwhile, America's self-exhausting post-Sept. 11 unilateralist bender triggered the illusion -- all the rage these days -- of a G-Zero, post-American world. The result, predictably enough for manic-depressive America, is that we've sworn off any overall responsibility for the South, even as we retain the right to go anywhere and kill any individuals -- preferably with flying robots -- that we deem immediately threatening to our narrowly defined national security interests. The problem with this approach is that China has neither the intention nor the ability to step up and play anything resembling a responsible Leviathan over the restive South, where globalization's advance -- again, with a Chinese face -- produces a lot of near-term instability even as it builds the basis for longer-term stability. Libya is a perfect example of where the world is now stuck: America is very reticent to get involved militarily, while China, for the first time in its history, engages in long-range military operations to evacuate its workforce there. Meanwhile, the expanding civil war rages on, to everyone's moral and economic distress. The point is not that America must invade Libya pronto to keep the world as we know it from coming to an end. But if the United States and the West sit by while the Rest, risers that they are, manage nothing more than pious warnings about needlessly butting in, then we all run the risk of collectively making the post-American, G-Zero, do-nothing storyline a self-fulfilling prophecy. While that alone won't stop the world from spinning, if it persists as a pattern, globalization will slide down another path: one of regionalism, spheres of influence and neocolonial burdens that are intuitively hoarded by great powers grown increasingly suspicious of one another. And if you know your history, that should make you nervous.

## Frontier K

The affirmative’s calls to “save the day” in Cuba through American engagement repeating the idea of the cultural deployment of military power throughout Latin America.

McPherson 09 (Alan, Associate professor of international and area studies and the Conoco Phillips Chair in Latin American Studies at the University of Oklahoma, April 2009, “Review of Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos by Louis A. Pérez,” JSTOR)//DR. H

The author now argues in Cuba in the American Imagination that metaphors of Cuba legitimated U.S. power by articulating a moral imperative that compelled Americans to dominate the island for their self-interest while pretending to do so selflessly for Cuba's benefit. From the day Americans imagined Cuba "at our very door" or as a "ripe fruit" in the nineteenth century, through turning points such as the war against Spain (and Cuban sovereignty) and the Cuban Revolution, Americans thought of Cuba using naturalized images–Cuba as a woman, as a child–that fit into normative patterns that the American public and its policymakers read as a warrant for imperial behavior (pp. 28, 30).

The argument is not necessarily new. Perez himself has made it previously, and John Johnson in Latin America in Caricature presented several cartoons in support of it. But the astounding variety and specificity of the metaphors examined and the breadth of the evidence make this book a must-read. The author reproduces no less than 105 illustrations, almost all of them U.S. cartoons.

In them, as well as in Congressional speeches, editorials, histories, films, travel books, novels, poems, theatre, and commemorations, the metaphors were obvious. In the nineteenth century, the image of proximity–Cuba as "almost within sight"–indicated that the colony beckoned to be taken from Spain (p. 27). Right after 1898, Cuba as child either misbehaving in a classroom, learning to ride a bike, or navigating a raft telegraphed U.S. doubts about Cuban self-government. Metaphors of cleanliness, meanwhile, buttressed U.S. military and civilizational policies. Later, Cuba as owing gratitude to the U.S. "liberator" justified the Piatt Amendment and still today, the metaphor of "neighborhood" allowed U.S. observers either to express concern or to restore order if the island made too much "trouble" (p. 37).

Perez offers a few metaphors of his own–"laboratory" and "microcosm," for instance–to add how the U.S.-Cuba relationship, while unique, also exemplified the cultural deployment of U.S. power elsewhere (p. 1). He even claims that this metaphorical armada helped Americans define themselves as a nation–a pure, self-less, moral global power.

This frontier mythology guarantees nuclear imperialism and violence

Slotkin 85 (Richard, Olin Professor of American Studies @ Wesleyan, The Fatal Environment, p. 60-61)

This ideology of savage war has become an essential trope of our mythologization of history, a cliche of political discourse especially in wartime. In the 1890s imperialists like Theodore Roosevelt rationalized draconian military measures against the Filipinos by comparing them to Apaches. Samuel Eliot Morison, in his multivolume history of naval operations in the Second World War, recounts the posting of this slogan at fleet headquarters in the South Pacific: "KILL JAPS, KILL JAPS, KILL MORE JAPS!" Suspecting that peacetime readers may find the sentiment unacceptably extreme, Morison offers the following rationale; This may shock you, reader; but it is exactly how we felt. We were fighting no civilized, knightly war . . . We were back to primitive days of fighting Indians on the American frontier; no holds barred and no quarter. The Japs wanted it that way, thought they could thus terrify an "effete democracy"; and that is what they got, with the additional horrors of war that modem science can produce.17 It is possible that the last sentence is an oblique reference to the use of the atomic bomb at the war's end. But aside from that, Morison seems actually to overstate the extraordinary character of the counterviolence against the Japanese (we did, after all, grant quarter) in order to rationalize the strength of his sentiments. Note too the dramatization of the conflict as a vindication of our cultural masculinity against the accusations of "effeteness." The trope of savage war thus enriches the symbolic meaning of specific acts of war, transforming them into episodes of character building, moral vindication, and regeneration. At the same time it provides advance justification for a pressing of the war to the extreme point of extermination, "war without quarter": and it puts the moral responsibility for that outcome on the enemy, which is to say, on its predicted victims. As we analyze the structure and meaning of this mythology of violence, it is important that we keep in mind the distinction between the myth and the real-world situations and practices to which it refers. Mythology reproduces the world with its significances heightened beyond normal measure, so that the smallest actions are heavy with cosmic significances, and every conflict appears to press toward ultimate fatalities and final solutions. The American mythology of violence continually invokes the prospect of genocidal warfare and apocalyptic, world-destroying massacres; and there is enough violence in the history of the Indian wars, the slave trade, the labor/management strife of industrialization, the crimes and riots of our chaotic urbanization, and our wars against nationalist and Communist insurgencies in Asia and Latin America to justify many critics in the belief that America is an exceptionally violent society.

The alternative is to vote negative as a rejection of frontier ideology – we must historically contest the narratives which drive our actions.

Trofanenko 05 (Brenda, Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction, University of Illinois, The Social Studies, Sept/Oct)

The debates about the overwhelming problems, limitations, and disadvantages of social studies education noted in the Fordham report attempt to reconcile and advance the idea of nation through a collective history. Our more pressing role as educators, in light of the Fordham report, is to discuss a more nuanced understanding of the U.S. history. This would advance, as noted in La Pietra Report, an understanding about “the complexity and the contexts of relations and interactions, including the ways in which they are infused with a variety of forms of power that define and result from the interconnections of distinct but related histories” (OAH 2000, 1). Taking the U.S. nation as only one example of social analysis involves recognizing the meanings and conditions out of which nations are formed. There is no one experience of belonging to a nation, no single understanding or enactment of sovereignty, and certainly no one meaning or experience of colonization or being colonized. There is, then, a need for these issues to be realized and to be a part of the questioning occurring within our classrooms. That would allow for the substantial reframing of the basic narrative of U.S. history (OAH 2000, 2). Toward a More Global Sense of the Nation Knowing how history is a site of political struggle, how we engage with social studies education means emphasizing how power, processes, and practices bear tangible effects on forging a national (and common) history by reproducing and vindicating inclusions and exclusions. Such a critique requires questioning how a singular, fixed, and static history celebrates the U.S. nation and its place in the world as that “common base of factual information about the American historical and contemporary experience” (27) argues for in the Fordham report. Our world history courses are central to defining, understanding, and knowing not only other nations but also the position of each nation in relation to the United States. The centrality that the west holds (notably the United States as an imperial power) is ingrained and willful in framing specific representations of the west that normalize the imperial practices that established this nation. The role that the United States holds on the world stage frequently remains unquestioned in social studies classrooms. Certainly, we engage with various images and tropes to continue to advance how the colonialist past continues to remain present in our historical sensibilities. Moreover, the increasing number and choices of archival sources function as a complement to further understanding the nation. If students are left to rely on the variety of historical resources rather than question the use of such resources, then the most likely outcome of their learning will be the reflection on the past with nostalgia that continues to celebrate myths and colonial sensibility. To evaluate the history narrative now is to reconsider what it means and to develop a historical consciousness in our students that goes beyond archival and nostalgic impulses associated with the formation of the nation and U.S. nation building. We need to insist that the nation, and the past that has contributed to its present day understanding, is simultaneously material and symbolic. The nation as advanced in our histories cannot be taken as the foundational grounds. The means by which the nation is fashioned calls for examining the history through which nations are made and unmade. To admit the participatory nature of knowledge and to invite an active and critical engagement with the world so that students can come to question the authority of historical texts will, I hope, result in students’ realizing that the classroom is not solely a place to learn about the nation and being a national, but rather a place to develop a common understanding of how a nation is often formed through sameness. We need to continue to question how a particular national history is necessary as an educational function, but especially how that element has been, and remains, useful at specific times. My hope is to extend the current critique of history within social studies, to move toward understanding why history and nation still needs a place in social studies education. In understanding how the historicity of nation serves as “the ideological alibi of the territorial state” (Appadurai 1996, 159) offers us a starting point. The challenge facing social studies educators is how we can succeed in questioning nation, not by displacing it from center stage but by considering how it is central. That means understanding how powerfully engrained the history of a nation is within education and how a significant amount of learning is centered around the nation and its history. History is a forum for assessing and understanding the study of change over time, which shapes the possibilities of knowledge itself. We need to reconsider the mechanisms used in our own teaching, which need to be more than considering history as a nostalgic reminiscence of the time when the nation was formed. We need to be questioning the contexts for learning that can no longer be normalized through history’s constituted purpose. The changing political and social contexts of public history have brought new opportunities for educators to work through the tensions facing social studies education and its educational value to teachers and students. Increasing concerns with issues of racism, equality, and the plurality of identities and histories mean that there is no unified knowledge as the result of history, only contested subjects whose multilayered and often contradictory voices and experiences intermingle with partial histories that are presented as unified. This does not represent a problem, but rather an opportunity for genuine productive study, discussion, and learning.